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The Texas Legislature will spend more than
$11 billion this year to fund public schools. Over
the years, the state has helped educate millions 
of children, enhancing the productivity of the
workforce and the vitality of the economy. Public
education has been a good investment for the
state. But disbursing $11 billion is no easy task.
Texas’ finance formula has been subject to recur-
rent legal challenges. Recently, the state Legisla-
ture formed a special committee to evaluate the
way funds are distributed and to possibly recom-
mend improvements.
The state has an ambitious finance formula
that distributes funds based on a school district’s
size, property wealth and other factors. Some dis-
tricts receive substantial aid. Part of the formula—
nicknamed Robin Hood—requires districts that
are considered wealthy to give money to help
other districts. Although it is intensely controver-
sial, the Texas plan has bolstered many of the
state’s poorest schools and garnered national
acclaim in so doing.
As the state takes a fresh look at public school
financing, it is a good time to explore the economics
The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 have profoundly affected the well-being
of U.S. citizens. Our sense of invulnerability is gone. Comparable events are
the October 1973 Arab oil embargo, which challenged our assumptions about
the continued availability of abundant, cheap energy, and the October 1957
Sputnik launch, which raised fears of intercontinental missile attack. Both of
those shocks triggered important changes in spending priorities. Both hit a
U.S. economy that had already been slowing. Both were accompanied or
promptly followed by recessions.
We can never know with certainty how the economy would have
evolved had the Sputnik launch, the oil embargo or the Sept. 11 attacks not
occurred. Such events are rare, and each has unique aspects. Moreover, our
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educational funding system. That system
can be further strengthened by address-
ing some of its unintended consequences.
Public Education Can Be 
a Profitable Investment 
Most people agree that there is an
important role for the public funding of
education.
1 The public benefits when in-
dividuals invest in themselves.
2 Commu-
nities with lots of highly educated resi-
dents tend to have higher property values,
higher average wages and more produc-
tive businesses. Educated individuals’ in-
creased earnings lead them to contribute
more income, sales, payroll and property
taxes. Educated individuals are less likely
to receive welfare, Medicaid or unem-
ployment compensation. They and their
children tend to be healthier, which should
reduce their use of the public health sys-
tem. Studies suggest that their children
are less likely to live in poverty or suffer
from severe child abuse—situations that
can have grave social consequences as
well as be a drain on the public purse.
Society also benefits because educa-
tion fosters technological change and eco-
nomic growth. Education boosts worker
productivity and earnings. (For example,
the lifetime earnings of a high school
graduate are nearly twice those of a drop-
out.) Moreover, well-educated workers can
help the people and machines around
them become more productive. Educated
workers are better able to move from job
to job, which helps speed the economic
transition that occurs when older indus-
tries fade and are replaced by newer
industries. In a sense, then, education
greases the wheels of economic growth
by facilitating the churning of jobs and
industries.
Clearly, education’s public benefits
are substantial and widespread. They
also spill across school district bound-
aries as children move away, taking their
education with them. One-third of U.S.
adults do not live in the state in which
they attended high school, much less the
same city or school district. To match the
benefits with the taxes, public school
finance must also spill across school dis-
trict boundaries and be handled by state
and federal as well as local governments.
A U.S. Tradition 
The United States has a rich history
of public education. When the country
was established, U.S. political and social
leaders believed that a minimum level 
of education was necessary to unite 
people of diverse backgrounds, forge
stronger communities and maintain a 
stable democracy.
3 As the country grew,
many state constitutions contained ex-
plicit provisions for public education.
States entering the union after the Civil
War were required to make constitu-
tional provisions for the equitable provi-
sion of education, though the implemen-
tation of these provisions varied from
state to state.
4
From those initial one-room school-
houses, public education in the United
States has grown into a big business,
with more than 5 million employees and
yearly spending exceeding $300 billion.
Each year, 45 million students (almost 
90 percent of school-age children) col-
lect their supplies and run to catch the
bell at one of our nation’s 88,000 public
schools. 
Those schools are financed through
a labyrinth of federal, state and local fund-
ing formulas. On average, local govern-
ments finance 45 percent of school bud-
gets, state governments 48 percent and
the federal government 7 percent. State
governments’ share varies from less than
10 percent in New Hampshire to almost
90 percent in Hawaii (Chart 1). The
patchwork of funding methods merely
hints at the vigorous debate that has
occurred as states strive to find fair and
equitable finance formulas.
Public Education, Texas Style
Like many states, Texas has a consti-
tutional commitment to public education.
The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted
the state’s constitution as requiring that
“districts must have substantially equal
access to similar revenues per pupil at
similar levels of tax effort.”
5 In response,
the Texas Legislature designed a com-
plex formula that distributes general
state revenues and property tax reve-
nues across the state.
6 (See the box titled
“Impact of the Texas School Finance For-
mula.”)
The formula has successfully equal-
ized, in rough terms, the amount of
money any given district can raise per
student. In particular, the state guaran-
tees that each additional penny in tax
per hundred dollars of taxable property
will give the district between $24.70 and
$29.50 in additional spending per pupil.
7
If the district is unable to raise at least
$24.70, the state makes up the differ-
ence. If the district is wealthy enough
that it raises more than $29.50, the state
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States’ Shares of Public School Funding, 1998–99
Chart 1
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Impact of the Texas School Finance Formula
Average Tax Prices for Texas’ Largest School Districts
Robin Hood payment
Enrollment Average tax price (millions of dollars)
Largest Robin Hood Districts
Highland Park (Dallas) 5,848 2.02 41.1
Eanes 7,392 1.46 27.3
Deer Park 11,428 1.43 40.9
La Porte 7,632 1.34 24.8
Carrollton–Farmers Branch 24,134 1.18 45.0
Texas City 5,817 1.15 9.6
Coppell 9,243 1.12 16.6
Grapevine–Colleyville 13,584 1.08 20.0
Plano 47,161 1.05 75.3
Brazosport 13,161 1.04 8.5
Richardson 35,138 1.01 30.4
Austin 77,816 .96 30.8
Largest Non-Robin Hood Districts
Dallas 161,548 .79 0
Arlington 58,866 .67 0
North East 50,875 .65 0
Houston 208,462 .60 0
Cypress–Fairbanks 63,497 .60 0
Northside (San Antonio) 63,739 .51 0
Fort Bend 53,999 .51 0
Fort Worth 79,661 .44 0
Garland 50,312 .43 0
El Paso 62,325 .38 0
Aldine 52,520 .32 0
San Antonio 57,273 .30 0
Ysleta 46,394 .22 0
SOURCES: Texas Education Agency; authors’ calculations.
One measure of a school finance formula
is its impact on the price taxpayers pay for
each dollar of revenue. A district’s average tax
price is its local tax revenues divided by its
spending.
1 Districts with an average tax price
above $1 raise more money than they spend,
with the difference going to help fund state
education spending in other Texas districts.
School districts with an average tax price
below $1 spend more money than they raise,
with the difference coming from state and
federal subsidies. The lower the average tax
price, the more a district benefits from the
school finance formula.
Most Texas school districts have an
average tax price substantially below $1.
Average tax prices in 2000–01 ranged from 
2 cents in Boles ISD to just over $3 in Palo
Pinto, Sabine Pass and Kenedy County ISDs.
As the chart illustrates, average tax prices
increase with property wealth and are higher in
the Robin Hood districts than in other districts.
This is also evident in the table, which presents
average tax prices for the largest Robin Hood
and non-Robin Hood districts. 
Interestingly, even Robin Hood districts
can have tax prices below $1. In 2000–01, the
tax price for Austin ISD was 96 cents because
the district received more money from the
state and federal government than it paid to
the state to help other Texas school districts.
Average tax prices do not tell the whole
story, however. Spending from the district’s
fund balance (accumulated reserves) lowers
the average tax price, while adding to the fund
balance boosts the average tax price. Accord-
ing to a district official, if spending from the
fund balance were included as local revenue,
Richardson ISD’s average tax price for 2000–01
would increase from $1.01 to $1.05.
2
In addition, average tax prices say little
about the formula’s effect on additional
revenue a district might choose to raise. 
As the district’s tax base gets farther above 
the guaranteed tax base, an increasing share 
of local revenue must be paid to the state in
Robin Hood payments. For example, the
Grapevine–Colleyville ISD currently must 
raise $1.42 for each additional dollar the
district wishes to spend.
Notes
1 For our measure, both revenues and expenditures exclude
bonds and are based on budget figures reported to the Texas
Education Agency.
2 Data constraints limit our ability to incorporate changes in
fund balance for all districts.
Distribution of Average Tax Price Among School Districts, 2000–01
Average tax price
Total property value per pupil in 1999 (thousands of dollars)











SOURCES: Texas Education Agency; authors’ calculations.requires districts in effect to give the dif-
ference to poorer districts in what have
come to be called Robin Hood payments.
Texas school finance equalization
appears to have achieved dramatic re-
sults. The proportion of economically
disadvantaged students passing all tests
on the Texas Assessment of Academic
Skills (TAAS) has increased from 39 per-
cent to 73.6 percent since the wealth-
equalization formula was implemented.
8
For example, the property-poor Ysleta
Independent School District (ISD) in El
Paso raised its passing rate on the TAAS
from 47.5 percent to 84.6 percent. Simi-
larly situated, the Aldine ISD in Houston
increased its passing rate from 50.7 per-
cent to 84.1 percent. While not every
property-poor district achieved such re-
markable gains in student performance,
the evidence is clear that some districts
were able to use their newfound wealth
to give students a better education.
As poorer districts in Texas have
improved, the nation has taken notice. 
A recent study by the Texas Educational
Excellence Project lauded the Texas sys-
tem for largely eliminating the impact of
school district wealth on student perform-
ance.
9 Noted education analyst Lawrence
O. Picus called Texas’ school finance law
“an excellent system of equity.”
10 And a
representative of the National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures went so far as
to say that many states now look to the
Texas formula as a model because it is
“one of the best systems out there as far
as equity is concerned.”
11
Unintended Consequences
There is little question that the Texas
school funding system has helped pro-
mote a more equitable distribution of
education across the state. In fact, the
Texas system generally follows the basic
principles of effective public finance (see
the box titled “Four Principles of Public
School Finance”). Yet there is reason to
believe that some aspects of the Texas
system are in need of revision. Several
property-wealthy districts recently chal-
lenged the constitutionality of Robin
Hood, and while the state Supreme Court
dismissed their challenge, it pointedly
did not dismiss the schools’ concerns
about Robin Hood payments.
The Robin Hood portion of the sys-
tem is only a small part of the total Texas
educational funding system; 73 districts
paid $538 million during the 2000–01
school year, which is less than 5 percent
of the state’s $11 billion education bud-
get. However, the amount of money
raised from property-wealthy districts
rose by more than 10 percent from the
previous year and has been predicted to
rise by as much as 20 percent in the
2001–02 school year.
12 Robin Hood pay-
ments will play an increasingly important
role in Texas school finance in coming
years. This suggests to many that the
finance formula’s problems will become
increasingly severe if not corrected soon. 
There are four areas of concern. The
finance formula weakens the link between
success and funding, reduces spending
on education in some districts, doesn’t
keep pace with the economy and dis-
torts educational decision-making.
Weaker Link Between Success and
Funding. The Texas school funding for-
mula gives districts less financial incen-
tive to improve their educational quality.
A city that improves itself attracts fami-
lies to the area, driving up property val-
ues and raising the amount of money
that flows into city coffers. In Texas,
increases in property value generate no
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Four Principles of Public School Finance
1. Treat equals equally.
Similar individuals should be charged the same price for basic educational services.
Several factors affect the cost of educating children, including variations in the cost of living or in
the needs of students. Finance formulas should recognize variations in these costs and direct additional
resources to high cost-of-education areas. 
In addition, wide disparities in property tax base raise practical concerns about tax equity. School
districts with ample commercial, industrial or mineral property wealth can reduce the homeowner’s tax
bill by taxing these sources, while residents of bedroom communities must foot the entire education bill
themselves. Residents should be able to profit from variations in property wealth that arise from local
school district policies but not variations that arise from other factors. 
2. Respect local tastes.
A community that wishes to purchase a high level of education for its children should be
allowed to do so.
Some parents strongly support education and are willing to tax themselves accordingly. It is
inappropriate for the state to prevent these taxpayers from devoting extra resources to the educational
needs of their children. 
3. Match benefits with taxes.
Whoever receives the benefit should pay the taxes.
The benefits of education fall first and foremost to students and their families, and the lion’s share
of education costs also fall to them. In the high schools, between one-half and two-thirds of U.S. school
resources come from the forgone earnings of students. Families also pay school taxes directly and pick
up much of the school tax burden that originates at the business level.
1
The public benefits of education spill over school district boundaries. Ideally, municipal, state and
federal governments should pick up part of the tab according to how far outside the local school district
boundary the benefits of education reach.
4. Avoid unintended consequences of redistribution.
Be sure that school finance formulas preserve economic incentives.
Income redistribution can harm school efficiency by reducing local involvement in public schools.
As the local share of school finance falls, residents have less incentive to monitor school performance
because residents reap fewer rewards from such monitoring. A recent study suggests that the larger the
state share in educational finance, the less efficient the public schools.
2
Redistribution can also reduce economic output by fostering public policies harmful to business.
As long as school district revenue is tied to the policies districts choose to pursue, school districts have
an incentive to choose wisely. Redistribution severs this link by sending one district’s gains across an
entire state, making any particular district less likely to care about how its policies affect economic
output in its district.
Notes
1 Because capital must earn a comparable after-tax rate of return in all parts of the world, taxes on business capital or business income are
actually paid by the people who work for the firm or buy its products.
2 Thomas A. Husted and Lawrence W. Kenny (2000), “Evidence on the Impact of State Government on Primary and Secondary Education
and the Equity–Efficiency Trade-Off,” Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 43 (April), pp. 285–308.the school finance formula didn’t increase
at all. Districts received less state aid,
and some started making Robin Hood
payments simply because a rising eco-
nomic tide lifted their boat along with all
the others. 
Distorted Decision-Making. While
most revenue and tax sources are in-
cluded in the revenue-sharing portion of
the Texas funding formula, taxes levied
to build schools or facilities are not. 
This gives affluent districts an incentive
to spend money on buildings rather than
on teachers or books because issuing
long-term debt does not increase their
Robin Hood liability to the state. 
Conclusion
Texas has developed a complex 
formula for disbursing and reallocating
funds to the state’s 1,041 traditional
school districts. This formula helps thou-
sands of Texas children receive a better
education and has garnered national
accolades for its role in equalizing edu-
cational opportunities. However, the for-
mula has also produced unintended side
effects that likely reduce the demand for
education in some districts and lower the
incentive for some schools to improve
educational quality. 
These problems do not negate the
significant benefits poor and average-
income districts reap from the Texas
funding formula. But they do suggest
opportunities to further improve the
school finance system in Texas. Mending
these frayed edges can make an already
strong educational funding system even
stronger and help the citizens of Texas
meet the challenges of the 21st century.
— Jason L. Saving
Fiona Sigalla
Lori L. Taylor
Saving and Sigalla are economists and
Taylor is a senior economist and policy
advisor in the Research Department of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
1 There is great debate over whether governments should do this by pro-
viding public schools or by offering vouchers, but this debate is
beyond the scope of this paper.
2 For a more complete discussion of the social benefits of education, 
see Lori L. Taylor, “The Government’s Role in Primary and Secondary
Education,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review, First
Quarter 1999, pp. 15–24.
3 Andrew J. Coulson (1999), Market Education: The Unknown History
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers), p. 75. It should be
noted that U.S. policymakers did not always live up to these lofty
ideals, such as the separate but equal educational system for Southern
blacks that persisted for a century after the Civil War.
4 David Tyack, Thomas James and Aaron Benavot (1987), Law and the
Shaping of Public Education, 1785–1954 (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press), pp. 20–21. 
5 Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391 (Tex.
1989).
6 The Texas school finance formula has two major components. The first
part, “Tier I,” provides a minimum level of funding for all school dis-
tricts that levy a property tax rate of 86 cents per $100 of property val-
uation. Each district’s Tier I funding is determined by adjusting a basic
allotment per pupil to reflect three factors: a cost-of-education index,
the size of the district and the presence of expensive-to-educate stu-
dents such as those with learning disabilities. The state calculates
each district’s Tier I level of funding, subtracts the local share (86 cents
times the value of taxable property in the district) and makes up the dif-
ference.
The second part of the formula, “Tier II,” guarantees that school
districts will raise roughly comparable revenue per pupil (adjusted 
for factors such as expensive-to-educate students) for each penny
increase in their property tax rate between 86 cents and the statewide
cap of $1.50. In effect, the state guarantees that each district can
behave as if it had a tax base of at least $247,000 per weighted pupil
and no more than $295,000 per weighted pupil. (Although the law pro-
vides a guarantee of $24.99, according to the Texas Education Agency,
other costs reduced the guarantee to $24.70.)
7 The formula is adjusted for variations in the cost of providing educa-
tional services. For example, expensive-to-educate students (such as
those with learning disabilities) count as more than one pupil for fund-
ing purposes.
8 Nearly half of Texas schoolchildren are considered economically 
disadvantaged. The passing rate for all children increased from 56 
percent to 82.1 percent between the 1993–94 school year and the
2000–01 school year.
9 Texas Educational Excellence Project (1999), “Examining the Effects of
School Finance Reform in Texas,” http://bush.tamu.edu/kmeier/teep/
reports.htm.
10 Jacques Steinberg (2001), “NY on a Familiar Road to School Financ-
ing Reform,” Dallas Morning News, January 19, p. 10A.
11 Associated Press (2001), “Group Praises State for School Funding,”
Dallas Morning News, October 27, p. 37A.
12 The number of Robin Hood contributors is expected to rise from 73 to
101 and the amount of revenue raised may be as high as $650 million
in the 2001–02 school year.
new revenue for most school districts. If
property values rise in a Robin Hood
school district, it is stripped of any addi-
tional revenue it might collect, even if
the revenue stems from the district’s suc-
cessful efforts to offer a better education
to its students. If property values rise in
a property-poor district, local tax pay-
ments will increase, but any additional
revenue results in a dollar-for-dollar
decline in state aid. Thus, for most dis-
tricts, funding is unchanged regardless of
district performance. 
Lower Spending on Education. Many
districts face a financial incentive to
reduce their educational expenditures. 
A Texas city that wishes to spend more
on police or fire protection simply raises
its tax rate by the appropriate amount
and then spends the money. A property-
wealthy school district, however, must
give more revenue to the state if it
chooses to raise its tax rate. Taxpayers
can be understandably reluctant to sup-
port local tax increases when they result
in larger payments to the state. This dis-
courages school administrators from 
suggesting increased educational expen-
ditures and discourages voters from sup-
porting such increases. For districts that
must pay money to the state, the Robin
Hood portion of the finance formula has
the same effect as a tax on education. 
Furthermore, school districts are not
allowed to raise their tax rate above
$1.50 per $100 valuation for the opera-
tions portion of their budget. This cap
prevents some residents from purchasing
the higher level of public education they
desire. 
Slow to Change. The static nature of
the finance formula may distribute reve-
nue in ways the Legislature did not in-
tend. Texas is one of the few states to
adjust its school finance formula to
reflect regional variations in the cost of
education. Unfortunately, the formula has
not been updated in the last decade, so
it currently distributes revenue based on
an outdated pattern of cost differentials.
For example, the cost-of-education index
treats Carroll ISD as a school district with
less than 2,000 students, even though
enrollment now tops 6,600. The finance
formula also suffers from bracket creep.
In 2000, the median home price in Texas
increased by 13 percent, but the effective
tax base for determining revenues under
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the measures necessary to combat it are
still developing. With this caveat in
mind, it appears that the Sept. 11 terror-
ist attacks subtracted perhaps 1 percent-
age point from annualized third-quarter
GDP growth, making what would have
been a small, positive number small and
negative. Spillover from the attacks makes
a much more significant GDP decline
likely in the current quarter. In contrast,
the outlook for the first half of 2002 has
been little affected. Unfortunately, that
outlook calls for output growth so slug-
gish that jobs will shrink and the unem-
ployment rate will continue to rise.
Preattack Trends
Chart 1 summarizes the economic
situation we were facing leading up to
the attacks. Consumer spending decel-
erated early last year but continued to
increase right through August 2001. In-
dustrial production rose unabated until
September 2000 and has fallen more or
less steadily since. Obviously, output
cannot contract indefinitely in the face 
of rising consumer demand. Consumer
demand cannot expand indefinitely if
firms continue to cut production and
jobs. One or the other of these trends
was going to have to give way.
There were hints, at least, that indus-
trial production might soon stop falling.
In early August and early September 
surveys by the National Association of
Purchasing Management, more manufac-
turers reported increases in orders than
decreases. The Conference Board’s com-
posite leading index was also signal-
ing improvement. Most analysts were
calling for a modest pickup in GDP
growth during the third quarter and a
further increase in the fourth.
Monetary policy played an impor-
tant role both in slowing demand growth
in the second quarter of last year and in
maintaining positive demand growth in
the face of a rising unemployment rate 
in 2001. Judging by the inflation-adjusted,
or real, federal funds rate, monetary policy
tightened from early 1999 through the
middle of 2000 and has eased almost
continually during 2001.
For evidence that monetary policy
still packs a punch, one need only look
at the construction materials and consumer
durables manufacturing industries, two
important interest-sensitive sectors. In
both, new orders topped out in early
2000—less than a year after the Federal
Reserve began to raise short-term inter-
est rates and roughly coincident with the
peak in real rates. In both sectors, de-
mand growth resumed quickly once the
Fed began easing in 2001 (Chart 2).
Was the policy tightening in 1999
and early 2000 a mistake? Inflation statis-
tics released over the past two and one-
half years suggest not. The GDP price
index, for example, accelerated by a full
percentage point during 1999 and 2000
before finally leveling off. While one can
quibble over the exact timing of the
Fed’s interest-rate moves, these results
suggest that policy was basically on the
right track.
1
Supply-Side Impact of the Attacks
What was the likely impact of the
Sept. 11 attacks on the economy’s capac-
ity to produce goods and services? A
good place to start is with the effects of
a natural disaster like the 1994 North-
ridge quake in Southern California.
Chart 3 illustrates how the level of
output is typically affected by a North-
ridge-style event. The chart assumes that
output has been rising at a more or less
steady pace and is expected to continue
to do so in the future (as indicated by
the dotted line). Instead, disaster strikes,
causing output to drop sharply. The level
of output remains depressed for a time,
but as damaged homes and factories are
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Trends in Industrial Production
and Retail Sales Are Inconsistent
Index, 1992 = 100 Billions of 1996 dollars
Chart 1















Construction and Consumer Durables Sectors 
Show Effects of Fed Policy
Percent per year Billions of dollars (quarterly)
Chart 2
NOTE: Q3 estimates are based on data through August 2001.
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Board; Census Bureau.





























$99.4Brebuilt and damaged furnishings and
equipment are replaced, output growth
is elevated (dashed  line). The economy
is soon back on its predisaster path.
Although the events of Sept. 11 fit
the natural disaster mold in many ways,
they are also reminiscent of the 1973
Arab oil embargo and the 1957 Sputnik
launch. Like these earlier events, the
attacks brought previously unappreci-
ated, continuing risks to the public’s
attention. It’s as if we not only experi-
enced a damaging earthquake on Sept.
11, but also discovered a whole network
of fault lines beneath our major cities.
Consequently, we are likely to see a
larger and more sustained shift of re-
sources than would typically follow a
natural disaster: instead of simply re-
building, we must build anew—differ-
ently from before. Unfortunately, it takes
time to plan new factories and train
workers in new skills, so layoffs, plant
closings and bankruptcies will initially
dominate the headlines and the statistics.
Instead of the immediate, strong boost to
growth that occurs during the recovery
from an earthquake or hurricane, we end
up with an output trajectory resembling
the solid line labeled “new path” in Chart 3.
Note that output never quite makes
it all the way back to its original path.
That’s because going forward we will
have to sacrifice efficiency gains for the
sake of enhanced security. For example,
firms may hesitate to consolidate their
operations or rely on foreign parts sup-
pliers. A larger military budget will take
resources away from the private sector.
Despite our efforts, some future terrorist
attacks may succeed.
The actual and prospective destruc-
tion of capital, the disruption associated
with resource reallocation, and the pros-
pect of higher military and security spend-
ing all make households financially worse
off by lowering asset values and reducing
future after-tax earnings.
The evidence suggests that, given a
constant real interest rate, consumption
shifts sharply downward in response to a
decline in wealth or earnings prospects
(Lettau and Ludvigson 2001). There’s the
rub. For in the wake of Sept. 11, new in-
vestment projects will not get under way
immediately, and military and security
spending will take time to ramp up to
their new, higher levels. Any sudden de-
cline in consumer spending may conse-
quently cause a shortfall in aggregate
demand.
To mitigate this potential problem,
the Fed can lower real, short-term inter-
est rates by enough to induce house-
holds to scale back their spending plans
gradually, rather than all at once.
2 As mil-
itary, security and investment spending
pick up, monetary policy will need to
reverse course and raise short-term real
interest rates to normal or even above-
normal levels. Getting the timing of this
switch right will be the major monetary
policy challenge in the year ahead.
The Outlook
Just how big a hit is the U.S. econ-
omy likely to take from the September
attacks? When will their impact begin to
fade and growth resume? Two forecast-
ing tools developed at the Dallas Fed
can help answer these questions.
The first tool is a forecasting equa-
tion for current-quarter GDP growth.
Official GDP growth estimates don’t
come out until a full month after the end
of each quarter. Our forecasting equation
provides us with a GDP prediction a
month and a half earlier than these esti-
mates. The forecast is based on monthly
employment, industrial production and
retail sales figures for the first two months
of the quarter. The forecasting equation’s
unique feature is that it uses only data
that were actually available at the time,
instead of data that have gone through
many rounds of revisions. The resulting
performance is superior to that of the
average professional in the Blue Chip
survey of forecasters (Koenig, Dolmas
and Piger 2001).
Based on monthly data through Aug-
ust, our model forecast 0.7 percent GDP
growth in the third quarter.
3 Actual third-
quarter GDP growth came in at –0.4 per-
cent, according to the Commerce Depart-
ment’s “advance” estimate. So, our best
estimate is that the Sept. 11 attacks sub-
tracted about 1 percentage point from
third-quarter growth, turning a small,
positive number into a small, negative
number.
The impact of the terrorist attacks on
third-quarter GDP growth would have
been even larger had the attacks taken
place in July or August instead of Sep-
tember. An extreme example illustrates
the point. Suppose the attacks had
occurred on the very last day of Septem-
ber. Then the average level of output in
the third quarter would hardly have
been affected, and third-quarter GDP
growth—which compares the average
third-quarter level of output with the
average second-quarter level—would
also hardly have been affected. Instead,
we would have seen weak fourth-quarter
GDP growth.
Well, the 11th of September isn’t at
the very end of the quarter, but it’s pretty
close. So if the direct impact of the
attacks subtracts 1 percentage point from
third-quarter growth, it is likely to sub-
tract roughly 3.5 percentage points from
fourth-quarter growth.
4 This timing story
helps explain why most private forecast-
ers are calling for a moderate decline in
fourth-quarter GDP instead of a moder-
ate increase.
Our second tool is an equation that
forecasts future employment growth using
financial-asset and oil prices. (Details are
given in the box titled “Forecasting Em-
ployment Growth.”) Financial-asset prices
are available daily and are not subject to
revision. Because they reflect investors’
expectations, they often provide the ear-
liest warnings of changes in the econ-
omy’s direction. Although they are often
individually unreliable, false signals often
cancel one another out when several
indicators are considered as a group.
The first indicator we use to forecast
employment growth is the junk-bond
spread, equal to the difference between
the returns on high-yield and aaa-rated
corporate bonds. It measures the risk that
marginal borrowers will default on their
loans. The spread widened markedly in








SOURCE: Author’s calculations.September and rose further in October,
to its highest level since the end of last
year. Bond investors are clearly concerned
that the economy will be weak in the
months ahead.
Stock prices are another important
(but not very reliable) indicator of future
employment growth. As of Sept. 10, the
Standard & Poor’s 500 index was down
28 percent from its all-time high in March
2000. At its postattack low, it was down
almost 37 percent. However, as of this
writing the index has recovered to its
Sept. 10 level. So the stock market’s sig-
nals, although not encouraging, are no
worse than before the attacks.
Oil-price increases both disrupt the
economy and act much like a tax hike
imposed by oil exporters (Brown and
Yücel 2000). Oil prices initially rose fol-
lowing September’s attacks but have since
fallen substantially. Unfortunately, because
the economy responds to oil prices with
a long lag, the residual effects of the
relatively high prices of 2000 and early
2001 will remain a drag on growth in
2002.
The only indicator that is giving us a
positive signal about future employment
growth is the real short-term interest
rate. It fell sharply in the first half of the
year as the Fed aggressively eased mone-
tary policy and fell sharply again follow-
ing Sept. 11.
Chart 4 shows actual employment
growth along with a forecast made nine
months earlier. Forecasts are calculated
using the four indicators discussed
above. You can see that earlier this year,
the forecasting model was predicting
essentially zero job growth in late 2001
and early 2002. However, in July, well
before the terrorist attacks, forecasted
employment growth turned sharply neg-
ative. Employment growth forecasts cal-
culated in August and September were
also negative. The most recent (October)
forecast indicates that jobs are likely to
decline at a 0.7 percent annual rate over
the first six months of 2002. So, the ter-
rorist attacks didn’t make the early 2002
outlook any worse than before, but that
outlook wasn’t bright to begin with.
Although job cuts will not be so great 
as to keep GDP growth negative, they
will drive the unemployment rate up to
about 6 percent by June.
Conclusion
There were conflicting trends in pro-
duction and sales prior to Sept. 11, with
production falling despite rising consumer
demand. Sooner or later, one of these
trends had to give way, and there were
encouraging signs that production might
soon bottom out. The attacks had a mild,
negative effect on third-quarter GDP, turn-
ing a weak increase into a small decline.
We’ll see a bigger negative impact in the
fourth-quarter statistics. The already bleak
growth outlook for the first half of 2002
hasn’t really changed very much, how-
ever. We’re likely to see output rising,
but too slowly to prevent further in-
creases in the unemployment rate.
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Forecasting Employment Growth
The forecasting equation that underlies Chart 4 is estimated using jobs, money, Consumer Price
Index (CPI) and Producer Price Index
1 (PPI) data from the last month of each quarter, and financial and
oil-price data from the 15th of the following month (reflecting the fact that jobs, money, CPI and PPI data
are released with a lag). Once the equation has been estimated, real-time monthly data are substituted
into its right-hand side to generate a monthly sequence of forecasts. The last two and one-half years of
forecasts displayed in Chart 4 are generated recursively (that is, estimated coefficients are updated from
quarter to quarter) to accurately depict the equation’s recent real-time forecasting performance.
The latest estimate, for the sample period running from 1986:Q1 through 2001:Q3, is as follows:
∆ Jobs = 3.936 – .994Dum90Q3 – 1.997Dum90Q4 – 2.737Dum91Q1 + .315∆ Jobs(–3)
(.522) (.167) (.160) (.212) (.111)
+ .025∆ Money(–3) + .155∆ Stocks(–3) – .338Spread(–3) – 5.577Oil(–6)
(.030) (.103) (.095) (2.312)
– 2.561Oil(–7) – 7.059Oil(–8) – .530Tbill(–3) Adj. R
2 = .849
(1.615) (1.843) (.092) S.E. = .579
The standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and a moving-average error
term. The variables entering the equation are defined as follows:
∆ Jobs: Annualized six-month growth rate of private nonfarm employment
∆ Money: Annualized six-month growth in M2 – annualized six-month growth in CPI
∆ Stocks: 100 × 12-month change in S&P 500 / nominal GDP lagged four quarters
Spread: Merrill Lynch yield on low-grade corporate bonds – Moody’s yield on seasoned aaa-rated
corporate bonds
Oil: Max[0, (WTI spot price / PPI) – (three-year average of WTI spot price / PPI)] × (preceding
year’s oil refinery inputs / preceding year’s real GDP)
Tbill: Yield on three-month Treasury bills – one-year inflation expectations, GDP price index, from
the most recent Survey of Professional Forecasters
In addition, three dummy variables are used to eliminate the effects of the Gulf War, on the grounds
that this shock to employment growth could not have been anticipated. (Similar treatment will have to be
given to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in future estimations as the sample period is extended.)
I include money in the forecasting equation for the sake of consistency because in other research
(not reported here) I have found that it helps forecast changes in the unemployment rate. I don’t discuss
money in the main text because it is unimportant for forecasting employment growth. Another financial
variable often touted for its forecasting power, the slope of the yield curve, has no marginal predictive
power for either employment growth or unemployment-rate changes at the horizon considered here.
Note
1 Finished goods excluding food and energy.9 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS   SOUTHWEST ECONOMY   NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001
high by historical standards. (Unemploy-
ment averaged 4 to 5 percent during the
1980s and 7.3 percent in 1990.)
Not only was Argentina’s economy
suffering adverse effects from internal
forces; it was also experiencing external
pressures. As financial crises swept Asia
in 1997 and Russia in 1998, investors
who were pulling their capital out of
those countries also began to withdraw it
from Argentina.
Dollarization and currency boards
help establish fiscal credibility, but they
do not guarantee fiscal health. Argentina
benefited from the currency board-like
system in the early years, but that suc-
cess did not lead to consistent fiscal
reform and investment. As a result of
expanding public debt and higher in-
ternational risk premiums, interest pay-
ments alone now account for a fifth of
total federal spending.
To add to the problem, until recently
the current system guaranteed Argen-
tina’s 24 provinces a monthly minimum
of $1.35 billion from federal tax revenues
regardless of how much had been col-
lected. Because of Argentina’s continu-
ing economic downturn, tax receipts fell
14 percent in September 2001 compared
with September 2000, forcing the gov-
ernment to reduce payments to the
provinces so it could keep paying on 
the national debt. Diminishing tax reve-
nues put pressure on Argentina to meet
its zero-deficit pledge.
1
Argentina’s prime lending rates have
more than tripled since last March.
August 2001 industrial production fell
about 6 percent from the prior year, and
preliminary September numbers indicate
a decline of over 10 percent—the largest
year-over-year drop since July 1999.
Argentina has not had one year of
positive current account balance since
1990; the current account deficit has
exceeded 4 percent of GDP in three of
the last four years. While a negative cur-
rent account deficit can reflect positive
aspects of an economy, Argentina’s case
has required some kind of price adjust-
Beyond the Border
ith the Argentine economy
in its third year of recession
and struggling with debt, the
global economic downturn has created
special complications for Argentine poli-
cymakers. Speculation as to how Argen-
tina will pull itself out of its deepening
recession is reigniting the debate over
exchange rate regimes: Will Argentina
maintain its current system, devalue its
currency or dollarize (abandon its cur-
rency, the peso, and accept the U.S. dol-
lar as legal tender)?
Hard-money currency regime non-
conformism is already a tradition in
Argentina. In 1989, when Carlos Menem
was elected president, Argentina had a
floating exchange rate and hyperinfla-
tion. In 1991, the Argentine Congress
established the Convertibility Plan, whose
cornerstone is a currency board-like sys-
tem that forbids monetizing government
deficits, that is, printing money to pay
the bills.
Under a currency board system, out-
flows of foreign currency reserves must
be matched by reductions in domestic
monetary base. The domestic currency
can be issued only in exchange for a
specified foreign currency at a fixed rate.
The Convertibility Plan allowed the use
of either U.S. dollars or Argentine pesos
in any transactions except wage and tax
payments. The Argentine peso was
pegged to the U.S. dollar at 1:1.
Argentina’s average annual inflation
rate fell from 600 percent in 1983–91 to
4.7 percent in 1991–99. The government
also initiated privatization of state-
owned industries and liberalized trade.
The reforms returned the economy to
growth. GDP grew an average 4.7 per-
cent per year from 1991 to 1999, two
recessions notwithstanding.
Economic Health Declines
Unfortunately, successes at the be-
ginning of the decade waned toward its
end. By the time Menem left office in
1999, Argentina had an increasing fiscal
deficit and 14.3 percent unemployment,
ment to push the current account toward
balance. The typical price adjustment for
international balance is devaluation, but
that is not an option under Argentina’s
currency regime.
The other option is deflation, which
has been occurring in Argentina since
1998. Deflation helped bring the current
account deficit under 4 percent of GDP
last year. Deflation has significant impli-
cations for Argentina’s debt burden,
however. When a country with debt has
deflation, nominal GDP can fall even
when real GDP is growing. If the nomi-
nal value of debt remains the same,
deflation means that the debt’s real value
increases.
Currently, Argentina’s country risk
premium, which reflects the perception
of increased risk as measured against
U.S. Treasury bonds, is its largest since
1995, when Mexico’s Tequila Crisis was
hammering Latin American markets.
Argentina’s country risk premium has
risen significantly against those of Latin
America’s largest economies, Brazil and
Mexico (Chart 1). Along with Argentina’s
ever-widening country risk premium, con-
sumer confidence is very low. According
to a recent poll, two-thirds of Argentines
have little hope that recovery is on the
way. Because domestic consumption
accounts for about 70 percent of Argen-
tina’s GDP, reviving consumer spending
is necessary to spur growth, raise tax
revenues and balance the budget.
Domestic confidence in the banking
system also continues to weaken, mak-
ing banks vulnerable to runs. July and
August saw about 10 percent of private
sector savings withdrawn.
Coping with the Debt
To address these difficulties, the
government is considering a debt swap
as a means of reducing the monthly
interest payments on both federal and
provincial debt. The swap would allow
creditors (local banks, pension funds
and provincial governors) to exchange
their existing bonds for new bonds with
W
Tough Decisions for Argentinaa lower interest rate. Policymakers depict
the plan as a means of coping with the
debt burden and instilling confidence.
However, world capital markets have
reacted negatively. Rating agencies have
warned that the debt swap could be
interpreted as a default if the bondholders
suffer significant losses.
Ten years after the introduction of the
Convertibility Plan, Economy Minister
Domingo Cavallo has introduced the
Competitive Plan in an attempt to re-
invigorate the Argentine economy. The
plan modifies the currency board. Ex-
ports (except oil) would be transacted
with a devalued peso and imports with 
a revalued peso. Also, when the euro
reaches parity with the dollar, the peso’s
anchor would change from the 100 per-
cent dollar peg to a fifty–fifty dollar–euro
peg.
The new rules provide an unofficial
devaluation or at least attempt to achieve
the effects of a devaluation: increased
exports and limited imports. Since
Argentina trades very little, the magni-
tude of the new rules may initially be
limited. Argentina’s exports-to-GDP ratio
is currently 8 percent, the fourth lowest
in the world behind Rwanda, Burundi
and Haiti. The country’s debt-servicing
costs continue to rise in relation to ex-
ports (Chart 2).
Some Argentine policymakers are
suggesting dollarization as an answer to
Argentina’s woes. They argue that mar-
ket speculation over a possible devalua-
tion has resulted in a loss of credibility
and that the replacement of Argentine
pesos with U.S. currency as the only offi-
cial medium of exchange would elimi-
nate Argentina’s currency risks, lower
interest rates and instill confidence. They
consider the Convertibility Plan, which
established the currency board-like sys-
tem, the best policy decision of the
1990s. Now they want to take it further—
with dollarization.
Conclusions
Both domestic and foreign investors
remain concerned about Argentina’s
ability to pay its debt and retain its fixed
exchange rate with the dollar. The zero-
deficit spending policy is a mammoth
challenge. Spending cuts are very difficult
to impose when people are suffering.
Declining growth and, consequently,
low tax revenues do not help lessen the
debt burden. However, one of Argen-
tina’s greatest strengths is its populace,
whose level of education is significantly
higher than that of other Latin American
countries. The hope is that they will be
able to make some tough decisions to
ultimately manage their difficulties.
—Sherry L. Kiser
Kiser is an associate economist in the
Research Department and coordinator 
of the Center for Latin American Economics
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Note
1 In July, the Argentine Senate passed a zero-deficit bill that requires the
government to spend only what it receives in tax revenues on a month-
by-month basis.
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Debt Servicing Costs Rising Relative to Exports
Percent of exports
Chart 2
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Before Sept.11
Prior to Sept. 11, the Texas economy was weak but begin-
ning to show a few signs of stabilization. Texas’ nonfarm
employment growth was weak in the second and third quar-
ters of 2001 but continued to grow faster than the nation’s. Pri-
vate employment growth appeared to have bottomed out in
April. The Texas Leading Index was predicting soft growth
over the coming three to six months. Energy prices were less
volatile, and the housing sector was healthy. TCPU (transporta-
tion, communication and public utilities) and services posted
strong employment gains in the third quarter, while employ-
ment in the manufacturing and construction industries slipped
in August and September.
After Sept. 11
As of this writing, little post-Sept. 11 data are available.
The September employment data do not fully reflect the events 
of Sept. 11. The data are for the pay period that includes 
the 12th day of the month, and those industries thought to 
be most affected do not show any significant change from
prior patterns. 
Anecdotal evidence gives the best picture of Texas’ new
landscape since the terrorist attacks. The Beige Book reports
that while not fully recovering to preattack levels, many of the
hardest hit industries, such as airlines, hotels and retail trade,
have bounced back a little from the steep declines they saw
immediately following the attacks. At the same time, however,
Regional Update
Texas and U.S. Quarterly Nonfarm Employment Growth
Percent* Number (in thousands)
SOURCES: Texas Workforce Commission; Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. *Quarter-over-quarter, seasonally adjusted, annualized rate.
SOURCES: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.






















Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct.
Regional Economic Indicators
TEXAS EMPLOYMENT* TOTAL NONFARM EMPLOYMENT*
Texas Private New
Leading Index TIPI† total Mining Construction Manufacturing Government service-producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
9/01 114.2 130.6 162.6 576.6 1,064.1 1,592.3 6,226.1 9,621.7 1,933.7 759.2
8/01 120.3 131.1 163.3 576.9 1,065.4 1,588.7 6,221.9 9,616.2 1,938.9 758.7
7/01 118.7 131.7 163.2 578.1 1,070.5 1,577.0 6,208.8 9,597.6 1,936.7 757.0
6/01 118.9 131.5 162.2 578.1 1,071.3 1,585.9 6,200.2 9,597.7 1,938.4 754.7
5/01 119.8 131.0 161.2 574.9 1,074.3 1,582.9 6,193.7 9,587.0 1,941.6 754.2
4/01 118.7 131.0 160.7 572.4 1,078.1 1,583.3 6,185.2 9,579.7 1,945.8 754.2
3/01 120.0 131.1 158.6 571.1 1,081.9 1,580.7 6,189.5 9,581.8 1,948.0 753.6
2/01 121.2 131.7 156.5 567.8 1,083.3 1,579.1 6,170.8 9,557.5 1,950.5 751.0
1/01 123.9 131.2 156.1 566.6 1,083.0 1,575.4 6,155.1 9,536.2 1,946.1 750.7
12/00 122.7 131.2 155.3 564.2 1,080.8 1,570.4 6,139.8 9,510.5 1,934.8 748.9
11/00 123.2 131.1 153.6 562.6 1,083.2 1,567.4 6,129.6 9,496.4 1,931.1 748.9
10/00 124.8 131.1 152.6 559.0 1,083.2 1,564.8 6,111.3 9,470.9 1,931.0 748.2
* In thousands.  † Texas Industrial Production Index.
For more information on
employment data, see “Reassessing
Texas Employment Growth” (Southwest
Economy, July/August 1993). For TIPI,
see “The Texas Industrial Production
Index” (Dallas Fed Economic Review,
November 1989). For the Texas Leading
Index and its components, see “The
Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation”
(Dallas Fed Economic Review, July
1990). Online economic data and
articles are available on the Dallas Fed’s
Internet web site, www.dallasfed.org.
a broad array of industries that had seemed only slightly
harmed are showing signs of increased weakness. 
Immediately following the attacks, the transportation and
distribution industry clearly suffered. Leisure travel declined
sharply, and business travel weakened further. American Air-
lines and Continental Airlines announced layoffs as well as
other cutbacks, such as in-flight meals and curtailed flight
schedules. Hotels, restaurants and amusements all suffered in
the aftermath but have since begun to level off.
Increased border enforcement is also slowing travel
between Mexico and Texas. Waiting times during rush hour
have increased to three to four hours. The delays have reduced
crossings and decreased retail activity by an estimated 15 to 50
percent in Texas border cities.
Weakening demand clouds the energy sector’s outlook.
After reaching around $30 per barrel after Sept. 11, oil prices
have settled back down to $22 to $23 per barrel. Drilling has
weakened, with the Texas rig count falling in the last week of
October to its lowest level since the first weeks of 2001. Texas
well permits declined 43 percent in September. 
What little data are available confirm a slipping Texas
economy. Announced layoffs for the state spiked in Septem-
ber, and all seven of the Texas leading indicators declined in
September, causing the Texas Leading Index to suffer its
largest decline to date at 5.2 percent. 
—Charis L. WardThere are several risks to these fore-
casts. For example, we may see major
new terrorist attempts or political up-
heaval abroad. A less obvious risk is that
the Fed will “get behind the curve,”
much as the Japanese central bank did in
the 1990s, and lower interest rates too
slowly to keep up with declining infla-
tion expectations. The October Univer-
sity of Michigan survey of households
shows a sharp fall in expected inflation
that bears watching.
On the plus side, the Fed has dem-
onstrated a willingness to act quickly and
boldly when economic developments
warrant it. Policy has proven itself to be
effective, first by slowing consumer
spending growth in 2000 and then by
sustaining it in the face of rising unem-
ployment during the first eight months of
2001. By the spring of 2002, the econ-
omy will benefit from the additional
stimulus the Fed has added to the pipe-
line since Sept. 11. Tax incentives de-
signed to kick start investment spending
are likely. Finally, no other economy can
so quickly shift resources from shrinking
to expanding industries.
We’re down, but not out. Brighter
days lie ahead.
—Evan F. Koenig
Koenig is a senior economist and vice
president in the Research Department of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
1 For discussions of the shifting economic environment in which the
Fed was operating over this period, see Koenig (2000a, b).
2 At the same time, fiscal policy can provide temporary favorable tax
treatment for investment, encouraging firms to accelerate their plant
and equipment spending.
3 All growth rates in this paper are annualized.
4 Counting only weekdays, Sept. 11 is 78 percent of the way through 
the third quarter. Assuming that the terrorist attacks shift the level of
output downward from Sept. 11 through the end of 2001 without
affecting the day-to-day growth rate of output (except on the 11th), the
attacks’ impact on fourth-quarter GDP growth will be approximately
78/22 = 3.5 times their impact on third-quarter GDP growth.
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